The recent visit of Amir Khan Muttaqi, the acting Foreign Minister of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, to India marks a significant shift in New Delhi’s diplomatic posture towards Kabul. Mr. Muttaqi’s meetings, press interactions, and his visit to Darul Uloom Deoband, a historic and influential seminary, were laden with symbolism and strategic intent.
While Mr. Mutaqqi projected moderation (not withstanding his first press conference where women journalists were not invited), the deeper subtext suggests an evolving real politic in which India weighs its security concerns, regional influence, and economic interest against its old principled unease with the Taliban. History of the Taliban When triumphant Taliban fighters entered Kabul in August 2021, it did not just signify the fall of a government, but the resurrection of an ideology of a deeply intolerant version of Islam.
Young men born in refugee camps studied and imbibed Wahhabi teachings at madrasas in southern Pakistan. Many were orphans of the Soviet war.
Led by an almost mythical figure, Mullah Omar, they wished to impose the strictest interpretation of Islamic laws. With the help of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, they seized Kabul in 1996. They banned girls’ education and barred women from jobs.
They forced men to wear long beards; persecuted ethnic religious minorities, particularly the Hazaras, and other Shias; and destroyed all vestiges of cultural heritage, including the Bamiyam Buddhas. Their association with al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, placed them squarely as the face of global terror. The major resistance to them came from Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was murdered by Osama’s henchmen, and from Abdul Rashid Dostum, who lives in exile in Turkey.
But as their regime collapsed and the Northern Alliance moved in, there was hope. Women moved freely, the long beards were gone, and the economy improved through help from member countries of the Northern Alliance and assistance from multilateral institutions. The Taliban melted away, but found shelter in Pakistan where they regrouped, rebuilt, and waited.
For the ISI, they were a strategic asset. This background was the reason why India downgraded its diplomatic relations with Kabul.
The Taliban re-emerged in 2021, projecting a more moderate face. But what has really changed? Gender discrimination continues and any resistance is brutally crushed. Public floggings are back.
Historically, India has always supported democratic governments in Kabul. After the return of the Northern Alliance in 2002, India spent over $3 billion on infrastructure, education, and capacity building.
Today, it has agreed to open its Embassy, provide humanitarian aid, and is attending regional dialogues. This stems from concerns over China’s growing footprint in Afghanistan. India also wants to take advantage over Pakistan’s weakening influence over the Taliban.
It also wishes to protect its investments and ensure that Afghanistan does not become a base for anti-India terrorist activity. Befriending Afghanistan However, while befriending Afghanistan, the Indian government would be well aware of the perils in this path.
In 1978, India established warm ties with Zia ul Haq’s regime and Zia led Pakistan into a dark abyss. It moved into an era when all norms of democracy were set aside; Prime Ministers were forced into exile, jailed, or assassinated; and the stranglehold of the Army and Wahhabi mullahs strengthened. Field Marshal Asim Munir embodies the lasting impact of Gen.
Zia’s influence. The Taliban too present similar risks.
Despite Afghanistan’s disturbed relations with Pakistan, the ISI’s role in the Taliban is old. If that is re-ignited, the Taliban may allow groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad or the Lashkar-e- Taiba to operate from Afghanistan.
India’s own image as a liberal democracy would also be adversely impacted when it supports an oppressive regime, for the Taliban is just not a political actor, but a militant movement rooted in a theocratic supremist ideology. Mr. Mutaqqi’s visit to Deoband has been played out in a big way and for the wrong reasons.
While he did receive a massive reception at the Darul Uloom, the impression being given is that Indian Muslims support the Taliban or their ideology. This is far from the truth.
While such ideologies can find resonance among unemployed youths or those who suffer from a belief that they are being persecuted, the overall reaction of Indian Muslims towards the Taliban is of abhorrence. But perceptions matter.
The reception that Mr. Mutaqqi received at the Darul Uloom has been so forcefully played out by sections of the media that it paints an entire community as favouring this form of Wahhabi Islam.
Also, the fact that this theory would find favour with a section of Hindus once again highlights the fragility of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Surely, the Government of India is aware of the dangers of this and must act to negate it. India’s engagement with the Taliban is not just a foreign policy manoeuvre; it is a test of how far the nation is willing to stretch the boundaries of its strategic pragmatism.
The immediate gains may lie in intelligence access and regional influence but there can be deeper costs. The challenge is not only to play the game of power politics, but to do so without losing the moral clarity that has long distinguished India’s international posture, and to ensure that it does not jeopardise inter-community ties in India.
Najeeb Jung, retired civil servant, former Vice Chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia, and former Lieutenant Governor, Delhi.